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**WAR OR PEACE – WHAT FUTURE FOR EUROPE:
NEW ARMS RACE OR DETENTE 2.0?
NEW PHASE OF THE COLD WAR AND ENHANCING OF THE EUROPEAN
SECURITY**

Slide 1 and 2. Though the Cold War that erupted soon after the WW2 has officially ended in November 1990 by signing of the **Charter for a New Europe** in Paris, this specific type of war has never ended. Moreover, in 2014/2015 it has acquired new dimension by entering into its new phase called the Colder War or the Cold War 2.0.

Some experts argue that it began in 1999 as the result of NATO enlargement, others claim that it took place in 2002 when the USA has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty or in 2011 when the USA started its ballistic missile defense system fielding in Europe. Others believe that the new phase of the Cold War began after the eruption of the internal Ukrainian crisis in Donbass.

Slide 3. As a veteran of the US diplomacy **Henry Kissinger** observed, the new Cold War really exists and it represents a danger that can be transformed into “a tragedy” if ignored. Such tragedy can be gradually modified into “a Hot War”.

Some insists that the Cold War was over. NATO chief **Jens Stoltenberg** speaking last May at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington said he did not believe that Russia and NATO are back to a Cold War-type conflict, but nonetheless the relationship is “at the lowest point in decades” due to the armed conflict in Ukraine.

In my remarks I will focus on the current stage of the European security and highlight the most destabilizing elements of it.

There are several outstanding features of the Colder War

Outstanding feature of the Colder War # 1: no movement in the arms control - the overall process has reached an impasse

In the last 18 months the rhetoric between NATO and Russia became militant, and mistrust has replaced the trust that has been created in the 1980s and 1990s of the last century. Besides major arms buildup in Europe there is a reverse side of the same coin: there are no arms control talks, and nobody is aware – for how long this phenomenon will last.

Currently, the USA and Russia relations remain at loggerheads in a great number of arms control issues.

Slide 4. For the sake of comparison: during the first period of the Cold War Moscow and Washington have been able to arrive at five **strategic offensive nuclear arms agreements (SOA)** and an **Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)**, three nuclear missiles de-targeting agreements between four nuclear powers (Russia and three Western nuclear powers). A cornerstone of the global strategic stability – the ABM Treaty – was signed. Additionally 13 **INCSEA accords** (incidents-at-sea prevention agreements) have been reached and two international Conventions on banning chemical and biological weapons, plus the **Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty)** entered into force.

The current century has in its records only two arrangements covering reductions of SOA in a form of Moscow (2002) and Prague Treaties (2010) – the latest known in the West as the New START and in Russia as START-3. Up to now there are only two treaties on arms control that are being implemented: the New START and the Open Skies Treaty (1992; signed by 34 states) – both quite successfully. Besides that there is no any progress at all. Total deadlock, with no light at the end of the tunnel.

The main cause of this failure has not changed for decades: there simply is not enough trust between the USA and Russia – trust needed to make tangible progress in nuclear, conventional and recently in missile defense.

If the USA and Russia had displayed more trust towards each other, the practical results in the arms control area could have been implemented with a greater speed than today. What is the reason? While replying to the question put by the Soviet journalists “Why is there mistrust between the USSR and the USA?” **President Ronald Reagan** on the eve of the first visit of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to the USA reminded them about a philosophic saying: “People mistrust each other because they arm, and people arm because they mistrust each other”.

Nowadays, instead of trust Russia and the USA are still facing the deep-seated mistrust.

15 UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN ARMS CONTROL

In his latest **interview to the German Der Spiegel Mikhail Gorbachev** admitted that during the 1980s “disarmament talks were not getting anywhere”.¹ At the same time he and his US counterpart Ronald Reagan have been able to make the most important determination: “Nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.

Slide 5. We are having the same story today as in the 1980s: **there are 15 such unresolved issues between them:** there are no talks on nuclear arms control, no negotiations on limiting anti-satellite weapons and missile defense, etc. Some of them really cover some areas of a paramount importance. These issues, if not resolved promptly and constructively, will constitute threats and challenges for the regional and the global stability in many years to come.

What are these issues? The picture to be painted will be frank, because we have an old folk saying: “Better to tell a sour truth, rather than a sweet lie”.

Slide 6 1) there is a continuous **US global missile defense deployment;** it is being fielded without any restraints, and it will not cease by 2022 – the final target date of the EPAA (European Phased Adaptive Approach) implementation. The Raytheon Corporation, the main subcontractor in producing the interceptor missiles, claims that the program will last till 2030 and beyond;

Slide 7. 2) there has been conversion of the US SSBN (strategic submarines equipped with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles) into **SSGN** (strategic submarines equipped with cruise missiles); they are not controlled by any verification mechanism; more than 600 cruise missiles even conventionally tipped can inflict a substantial damage to Russia’s command and control system;

3) both Moscow and Washington failed to find a proper **counting rules to count their Strategic Offensive Arms:** a) the numbers in their strategic offensive nuclear warheads stored in the active reserve are not subject for reductions; b) how to count heavy strategic bombers – delivering the real number of arms or as one unit (currently one strategic bomber is counted as one unit though it can carry 20 air-launched nuclear cruise missiles and 16 tactical nuclear bombs);

4) there is a problem with the rules **to count strategic Offensive Arms stored in active reserve;**

¹ *Mikhail Gorbachev.* US Military “Insurmountable Obstacle to a Nuclear-Free World”. Der Spiegel Online International. 2015. August 6. Interview conducted by Joachim Mohr and Matthias Schepp. See: <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/gorbachev-calls-for-nuclear-free-world-on-hiroshima-day-a-1046900.html>>.

5) the long-range nuclear-tipped **SLCM** (sea-launched cruise missiles) have not been limited between Moscow and Washington at all;

Slide 8. 6) the USA still has up to **500 tactical nuclear warheads** (TNW) outside its territory: in four European states (Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and in the Asian part of Turkey; it is a single state in the world that deploys TNW in foreign countries;

Slide 9. 7) there is no accord on proliferation of **INCSEA agreements** (incidents-at-sea-prevention agreements) on strategic nuclear-powered submarines (12 collisions have been recorded so far between American and Soviet/Russian nuclear-powered submarines close to the Russian shores); two attempts made by Moscow to resolve this issue failed; only American writer **Tom Clancy** managed to resolve the issue in his bestseller "The Hunt for the Red October" when he wrote that allegedly the USA and Soviet Union have agreed not to dispatch their SSBNs outside 500 nautical miles from their shores;

Slide 10. 8) there are still different **nuclear doctrines** between the USA and Russia: the US is based upon general nuclear deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence - with the first nuclear strike provisions in the form of preventive and preemptive strikes; two superpowers have also different missile defense, space and naval doctrines; too many meetings held in the framework of the **Vienna Seminars on military doctrines** have brought no tangible results during a decade of the debates;

Slide 11. 9) there are no even simple consultations on drafting a qualitatively **new Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE-2)** between East and West;

Slide 12. There is a big gap in military expenditures between NATO and Russia; and in military hardware between them.

Slide 13. 10) there is no international accord on **PAROS** (prevention of arms emplacement in the outer space); only weapons of mass destructions are prohibited to be used in outer space; there are no talks on limiting of ASAT weapons (anti-satellite weapons) though Barack Obama being a candidate for the presidency spoke in favor of conducting such talks with Moscow;

11) there are mutual accusations coming from Moscow and Washington on violating of the **Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty**: Moscow accuses its counterpart in testing missile defense interceptors by using medium-range (1,000-5,500 km) and "intermediate-range" ballistic missiles (3,000-5,500 km); while Washington claims that the Russian side is testing a new cruise missile and a new "intermediate-range" ballistic missile; both sides constantly deny all these charges;

Slide 14. 12) during last 11 years the USA and NATO are conducting Air Force Operation **"Baltic Air Policing"** in the airspace of three Baltic nations during 24 hours a day, 365 days a year involving the DCA (dual-

capable aircraft) that can carry nuclear free-fall bombs; from Estonian AFB Ämari to Saint Petersburg can be reached within 10 minutes;

13) Washington still deviates from the ratification of the **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** or **CTBT**– in 2016 there will be 20th anniversary since it was signed and has not entered into force; from 44 countries whose ratification of this arrangement is a must for its enacting 8 states have not done so, including the USA;

14) there is no global agreement on limitation of the **armed unmanned aerial vehicles** or armed UAVs that are frequently used against civilians, especially in Pakistan, Afghanistan and other nations;

Slide 15. 15) finally, there is no global agreement on limitation of **hypersonic conventional weapons** that can be used together with nuclear weapons or separately under the “Prompt Global Strike” strategy.

Outstanding feature of the Colder War # 2: increasing number of military factors in the global and European situation

Unlike in the past, Europe now is witnessing **qualitatively highest level of military potential and military activity on its continent.**

There are three main issues producing direct effect on the European stability: the United States continues to maintain significant nuclear arsenals in some European countries.

Slide 16. The Pentagon still deploys nearly 500 tactical nuclear weapons with a possibility to bring a new type of free-fall nuclear bomb B-61-12. In June 2015 the US Air Force has bolstered its presence in Europe with the temporary deployment of strategic bombers to the United Kingdom: three Boeing B-52H Stratofortress and two Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit, and ground attack aircraft to Ämari, Estonia: eight A-10 Thunderbolt II.² After Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings the Pentagon planned to use tactical nuclear weapons seven times.

Moscow also repeatedly airs grievances regarding NATO. Despite the dissolution of the Soviet-era military Warsaw Pact, NATO, far from following that example, has expanded its membership from 12 original nations to 28 and does not want to stop there. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are in the waiting list.

Slide 17. In 2016 the USA will have on the European continent and around it about 360 land-based and sea based interceptors. A global missile defense system has been gradually created: an interim stage has been reached. In the short run operational **missile defense silos** in Romania and Poland will house not only defensive interceptors, but land-based cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles that are offensive weapons. In 5-6 years

² Jennings G. USAF sends bombers and attack aircraft to Europe in show of support// Jane's Defence Weekly.2015. June 17. P. 5.

timeframe a radical deterioration of the BMD issue will take place between Moscow and Washington when overall quantity of the US strategic interceptors will exceed the number of Russian strategic nuclear carriers by nearly **by 3 times**.

Slide 18. Very soon the missile defense arms race will embrace the entire globe. **95% of all US BMDS assets will be emplaced in the World Oceans.** Under the Sea Law Convention combat vessels can sail at high seas freely, with no restrictions. So, a strategic stability will be radically undermined.

Slide 19. The unlimited buildup of conventional forces is gaining momentum. NATO has an overwhelming superiority over Russia in terms of conventional weapons in Europe: 24,000 combat aircraft and 800 blue-water combat ships. While the **Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 1** and 1A are dead, even a symbolic consultations to tackle a possibility of elaborating a new **Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 2** have not started yet.

Slide 20. The demise of these two CFE Treaties was the result of unfair approach to them: it has been ratified by only Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, but not a single one of the treaty's NATO signatories. The treaty contained various types of artificial restrictions with regard to Russia, such as the 'flank limitations' set by the **Flank Agreement**; three Baltic states refused to become parties to the treaty after they have joined NATO. In addition, throughout the duration of the treaty, its Western signatories have been opposing to issuing a definition of the term "*substantial combat forces*" in relation to this arrangement.

Slide 21. Lately, 150 US military bases have been augmented by 8 more military installations, 6 NATO command centers in six European nations and one NATO Naval HQ in Varna (Bulgaria). But there are no Russian military bases around the USA, the UK, France or Germany and many other NATO member-states.

A qualitatively highest level of military potential and military activity of NATO along the Russian borders has been reached. The Alliance Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that such activity in general terms has increased **five-fold**. Russian Naval Staff claims that NATO naval activity increased **four-fold**. The number of large-scale military drills has sharply increased. In 2015 NATO plans to organize 200 a large-scale military exercises.

Slide 22. Three years ago Europe has acquired a new military mechanism: the transatlantic Alliance for the first time has arranged a three-tier tool in the form of an "appropriate mix" of nuclear, missile defense and conventional forces. It was stamped at NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012. Thus, the '**Chicago Triad**' has been created that is comprised from 'forward deployed forces'. Last September such new mechanism was again reiterated at the Alliance Summit in Newport, Wales.

The updated in February 2015 "**National Security Strategy of the USA**" enacted by the US President clearly states that the US Armed Forces will be used at any place around the globe.

The Ukrainian crisis with nearly 7,000 Ukrainian civilians killed, 15,000 Ukrainian men and women wounded by Kiev war-fighting machine. The war of genocide has created more than 1 million Ukrainian refugees outside Ukraine and 900,000 as internally displaced persons on Ukrainian territory have added negative feature to the current instability in Europe. There is a strong desire by Kiev to regain both Crimea and Donbass by using military power and lethal weapons supplied by 11 NATO-member states on bilateral basis.

President Poroshenko's statement to the STB channel made last summer is alarming: "The war will be over for Ukraine only when it regains Donbass and Crimea". In mid-August Kiev has officially informed the UN Secretary General about its inability to implement the **Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty** wishing to start a major offensive in Donbass.

Ukraine refuses to implement all 13 provisions the Minsk-2 accord by referring it as a 'declaration of intent' as the Ukrainian Supreme Court has identified it. Instead of withdrawing heavy weapons from the line of disengagement Ukrainian leaders have amassed by mid-August 2015 near Donbass 80 battalions, 435 tanks, 132 MRLS, 830 artillery pieces and mortars near the contact line in Donbass, and started using MRLS 'Grad' against residential areas. Too many facts show that Kiev is preparing for an all-out war in Donbass. There is no buffer zone, but rather a front-line in Donbass.

The Ukrainian National Security Strategy adopted recently and will be valid till 2020 is aimed at further militarization of Ukraine and provoke further escalation of conflict in Donbass. By the way, Russia has been called in this Strategy as 'aggressor' and 'the main external threat' to Ukraine".

During last 25 years Washington has engineered and arranged 'color revolutions' in 12 independent states, and together with its allies has used military forces in more than 50 cases.

Taken together, such elements are creating dramatic threat torpedoing the security throughout the entire European space and the world at large. The current situation is such that it can get out from control very quickly.

PRACTICAL STEPS IN GENUINE ARMS CONTROL

Slide 23. If anyone makes an attempt to describe last century in a single word, it could probably be labeled as "the nuclear arms age". But what about the current century? It is quite possible to identify it as "an age of missile defense arms race".

While in terms of arms and armaments the 20th century was labeled as the age with substantial quantity of strategic nuclear warheads of the two major nuclear powers (e.g. 6,000 warheads under the **Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 2 Treaty** per each side, namely the USA and the Soviet Union) and their limited number of missile defense interceptors (100 per each side), in the 21st century there will be quite the opposite strategic equation: there will be more interceptors rather than strategic warheads. On the surface it looks not so bad: defensive interceptors do not kill people. But on the other hand such phenomenon has negative feature: the temptation to deliver the first nuclear strike is very high – to deliver it and protect yourself by a great number of interceptors.

But, on the other hand, it is also clear that just one missile fired by either side will bring on an avalanche of world-wide destruction – and neither country will survive. By inventing nuclear weapons the entire human race has lost its immortality.

Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA)

Slide 24. Nuclear concepts predetermine the development of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, that is lack of readiness of the USA to reconsider its commitment to the “offensive nuclear deterrence” that provides for the delivery of the first nuclear preemptive and preventive blow, with Russia being included in the respective list in the first place and the PRC in the second. This is the main substance of the US STRATCOM Operation Plan 8010-12 «Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment» updated July 2012 and in June 2013.

In the Soviet era both Moscow and Washington missed opportunity to arrive at a greater breakthrough in nuclear arms control: The West has not supported **Mikhail Gorbachev’s master plan** to eliminate nuclear weapons globally by 2000 when in March 1985 he called for the “complete destruction of nuclear weapons and a permanent ban on them”. In his turn, Mikhail Gorbachev has not noticed the offer that came from President Ronald Reagan, when on August 26th, 1987 in the City Hall of Los Angeles he urged Moscow to move **“towards transition to defensive deterrence that threatens no one”**.

There are several issues that have not been resolved so far in this domain: “the return potential” or those strategic nuclear warheads that are kept in active reserve (at the beginning of 2015 the US strategic nuclear warheads in active reserve constituted nearly 65% of those operationally deployed). The other areas of disagreement include: nuclear tipped, long range **sea-launched cruise missiles** are not substantially limited by the respective accords. The *de jure* linkage between offensive and defensive arms has been incorporated in the disarmament treaties, but not implemented *de facto*. There are no limitations on strategic carriers equipped with non-nuclear warheads, and there is no real counting of nuclear weapons aboard heavy strategic bombers.

It is evident that the two sides have to take into account the setbacks of the **Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 3** (known as the 2010 Prague Treaty or **New START**) while drafting START-4. Anatoly Antonov, Deputy Defense Minister and the former head of the Russian delegation at the New START talks, has admitted that the New START like the START-1 failed to find a solution for the long-range **sea-launched cruise missiles**, it does not have any limitations on non-nuclear strategic delivery systems. **Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov** also points out that he “would like to have more [provisions] covering a “return potential”, to fix an inter-relationship between the strategic offensive arms and missile defense, and to make a new arrangement [on SOA] more qualitative and comprehensive”.³

At the G-20 summit held in Lough Erne Russian President Vladimir Putin has confirmed Russia’s stance that while calculating further SOA cuts Moscow and Washington have to take into account **all factors influencing upon strategic stability**. They have to include: missile defense, prevention of arms race in outer space, strategic carriers fitted by non-nuclear warheads as well as huge disparity in conventional arms.⁴ Russia suggests that hypersonic weapons with pin-point accuracy to be developed in the framework of the “Prompt Global Strike” have to be taken into account as well.

President Barack Obama said that he understood the necessity of those factors while identifying next steps in nuclear arms control, but after that he did not made any substantial specific move so far. That is why it is difficult to imagine that a nuclear-free world can be attained in the current century. The USA may spend from US \$ 335 billion during upcoming decade to US \$ 1 trillion during the next 30 years. The overall US SOA modernization program will last till 2075 and beyond. A completely new strategic triad will be created.

“**The USA Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy**” stamped last summer will cement the core foundation of the US nuclear doctrine that is “offensive nuclear deterrence” and its important portion - “extended nuclear deterrence” that provide a nuclear umbrella to all NATO member-states plus a number of allies in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific Region. The most detailed assessment of this strategy has been published by the Russian MFA “International Affairs” magazine last September in Russian.⁵

So, what to do? The New START (START-3) has to be implemented in full. After reaching the stage of START-4 till START-6 all other nuclear

³ *Antonov A. Arms Control: History, Current Status and Perspectives*//Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia Publishing House. 2012. P. 52.

⁴ Из ответов Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова на вопросы программы «Вести в субботу». 2013. 22 июня.

⁵ See the details: *Козин В. «Новая» ядерная стратегия США и ее последствия для России*//Международная жизнь. 2013. Сентябрь. С.60-85; *Козин В. Ядерная доктрина и прогноз военной политики США до 2075 года: критический анализ, практические рекомендации*. Saarbrücken (FRG): LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. 2014. 76 С.

weapon states – both *de jure* and *de facto* – need to be invited to join in the relevant debates and agree to cut their nuclear arsenals.

Russia and the USA could debate lower limits for their SOA, provided three outstanding obstacles that have principled strategic significance are removed.

Moscow and Washington should agree once and for all not to use nuclear weapons first against each other and not to deploy their missile defense systems near the borders of the other side. Russia has repeatedly declared its willingness to show restraint in the area of missile defense. A refusal by both sides to use nuclear weapons in a first strike would make the deployment of American missile defense systems at the "forward lines" illogical and set an example of real cooperation for other nuclear states.

A new START-4 or the next New START has to be deeply rooted on the principle of equality and equal security, really take into account strategic and tactical nuclear arms delivered by heavy strategic bombers and strategic submarines with cruise missiles with the range of more than 600 km – whether tipped with nuclear or conventional warheads. Such treaty should also incorporate tough linkage between the strategic nuclear arms and missile defense weapons, including those fielded on the Russian or the US territories or deployed in foreign countries by the Pentagon and in the World Oceans close to their respective territories.

The Barents, Baltic, Mediterranean and the Black Seas have to be turned into nuclear and missile defense weapons-free zones for extra-regional nations. The same zones have to be proclaimed near the US Atlantic and Pacific shores on a reciprocal basis.

To attract all other nuclear-weapon states into a nuclear arms reduction negotiating process three tasks have to be fulfilled:

- Russia and the USA have to agree to downsize their nuclear capabilities up to comparable aggregate limits equal to limits of other nuclear-weapon states – with the pledge of the latter that they will never increase them in the future; such agreements could well be reached during START-4, START-5 and START-6 negotiations between Russia and the USA;

- all nuclear "haves" – both *de jure* and *de facto* – must set up an approximate deadline when a nuclear-free world will be created, e.g. by the year **2045** – upon mutual consent (2045 is my personal suggestion);

- all nuclear-weapon states **have to declare a no-first use of nuclear weapons versus each other – not later than 2016-2017.**

- after the Vienna accord has been reached on banning **Iranian military nuclear program**, the world community has to ask Israel to renounce from its nuclear weapons – either within the same format or in the

framework of the international conference on the Middle East as a zone free from weapons of mass destruction.

Obviously, there is a need **not to revive the former anti-ballistic missile Treaty** or **ABM Treaty**, but to draft **a new multilateral** that will limit interceptors and zones of their deployment outside national territories of the parties to the arrangement.

Writing on the wall: without overriding all these three barriers negotiating START-4 is non-expedient. If these obstacles are not removed: a) the carefully crafted balance between strategic nuclear weapons and missile defense weapons observed by the two sides for 40 years will be destroyed; b) the world community will not be able to prevent the nuclear and missile defense arms race on a global scale.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)

Slide 25. In spite of certain success gained in downsizing the SOA, the two sides have never conducted official **TART – or tactical nuclear arms reduction talks**. But it is impossible to start such talks because of unequal starting positions the two sides have embarked upon: while Russia has pulled back all its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) from three former Soviet republics to its soil about 20 years ago, the USA has not done this yet. There will a problem with the definition of the TNW: there are seven different formulas describing them.

The US tactical nuclear weapons is being constantly modernized, and three free-fall nuclear bombs, namely, B-61-7, B-61-11 and perspective B-61-12 are referred by the Pentagon and the US State Department as 'SOA', if they are delivered by B-52H and B-2A strategic bombers.

TART between Russia and the USA cannot commence because after Washington began implementing "The European Phased Adaptive Approach" towards the missile defense.

That is why in is not possible and not expedient to start any talks on TNW with the United States and to launch any confidence-building and transparency measures related to such weapons, to conduct inspections of Russian TNW sites, to reduce combat status (combat readiness) of the TNW and to implement other relevant measures without resolving the missile defense issue and the TNW issue per se (or, at least, without overriding its geographic aspect).

No doubt: trust-building and confidence-building are vital notions in the arms control area. However, due to the aforementioned reasons that are having direct bearing on Russian national interests, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies denied a proposal put forward by Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and European Leadership Network (ELN) in their joint October 2013 Report that suggested that in terms of tactical nuclear weapons NATO and Russia could agree on a set of transparency measures,

such as information exchange, and basic constraints, including a pledge of not increasing the number of tactical nuclear weapons.⁶ This notion could be relevant if Russia has stationed TNW near the continental USA. But Moscow has not done this since the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.

Russia cannot neglect the fact that up to the year of 2038 the USA will spend more than **US \$ 65 billion** for the modernization of its tactical nuclear weapons, including that of in Europe. Russia has taken into consideration that the US Air Force will retain aircraft capable of carrying these weapons up to 2070 and has modernized 13 centralized tactical nuclear depots in Europe. Due to Ukrainian crisis the Pentagon has sent additional tactical nuclear bombs to Italy.

The issue of the INF Treaty violations

Slide 26. Both Washington and Moscow are accusing each other in violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or INF Treaty provisions.

The USA claims that Russia is violating the INF by introducing new **R-500** operational cruise missile and the next-generation intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile **RS-26 or 'Rubezh'** in Russian.

The fact is that R-500 that is mentioned in the American military documents, does not fall under any of the categories listed in the INF. That treaty required the destruction of two classes of nuclear missiles: ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles of "intermediate- and shorter-range," meaning able to travel 1,000-5,500 km. and 500-1,000 km., respectively.

The new Russian cruise missile in question has a maximum range of less than 500 km. The Russians have not officially released any other information regarding its range. Nor have the Americans officially issued such information. In addition, the US delegation did not file any specific complaints about the missile during the special US-Russian consultations on arms control held last fall and this past spring. They just claimed that the Russians have tested "some kind of missile and they know what we are talking about..." But this is not a serious conversation. As Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted on June 9 of this year, "We are ready to examine any concrete evidence that gives the Americans reason to think that we have violated something."

Russia's next-generation intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile **the RS-26 or Rubezh** has a range of over 5,500 kilometers and is also not subject to the INF's restrictions, since that treaty does not apply to nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of over 5,500 km. The numbers of those missiles are to be reduced principally through other agreements, such as strategic offensive reductions treaties.

⁶ PISM-ELN Report. Starting the Process of Trust-building in NATO-Russia Relations: the Arms Control Dimension. Warsaw: PISM.2013. P.5.

The question arises: why does Washington need to create a manifestly counterproductive drama around some pseudo INF violations by the Russians, and particularly by resorting to a range of threats that have never before been issued in such a bombastic way?

The main reason is that the US is trying to prevent Russia from developing two effective missile "antidotes" to the American system to intercept ballistic and cruise missiles – Moscow is developing a new cruise missile and a next-generation intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile capable of challenging the high-tech US missile-defense infrastructure. Washington wants to be able to deliver a first nuclear strike against Russia, China, Iran, and other states without fear of reprisal, with an eye toward creating a future world order.

The second compelling reason why Washington has decided to trot out this improbable accusation about Russia's INF "violations" is that the US itself has already repeatedly violated and continues to violate that treaty, when it uses "shorter-, medium-, and intermediate-range" ballistic and cruise missiles as targets to test its missile-defense systems. **In particular, target missiles are being used such as the Hera (with a range of 1,100-1,200 km), the MRT-1 (with a range of 1,100 km), and the ELRALT (with a range of 2,000 km).**

Another example of Washington's violation of this treaty will be if they install land-based cruise missiles in the launchers of the American missile-defense systems in Romania and Poland (that will become operational in 2015 and 2018, respectively), which can be equipped with a total of 48 missiles (24 missiles in each case).

June 4th, 2015 a portion of a report by **Army General Martin Dempsey**, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, was declassified, in which he claims that Washington is considering deploying cruise missiles with nuclear warheads in Europe as a response to Russia's alleged "violations" of INF Treaty, which the United States and Soviet Union became party to back in 1987.

The Associated Press (AP) rightly notes that the potential return of American medium-range missiles to Europe, as mentioned by **Army General Martin Dempsey**, is reminiscent of the darkest days of the Cold War.

And that's true if we take into account the fact that, as the AP points out, the White House is considering three options for its military response to Russia's INF "violations": developing defensive, i.e., anti-ballistic systems; launching a preemptive "counterforce strike" against any weapons that violate the treaty; and using "nuclear weapons to destroy military targets" on enemy territory, meaning inside Russia. But that would be a direct violation of that treaty by the United States itself.

Four days later a similar statement was made by British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, who announced London's willingness to once again accept US nuclear missiles, which were removed from British bases in 2006. In so doing, the United Kingdom has joined those who are criticizing Moscow for an "offense" that the Russians have never committed at any time or in any place.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated at a press conference on June 9 that "Russia has no intention of breaking this treaty." Moscow has claimed that it is still willing to hold an honest dialogue that is meaningful – not merely empty words – in order to allay any concerns related to arms control.

How to Really Avert a Nuclear War?

Slide 27. The huge unresolved issue with nuclear weapons between the major nuclear powers is that they regard the use of nuclear weapons differently: the USA is still committed to use nuclear weapons first, irrespective whether it is attacked or not, while Russia – only in response of an massive attack. Moscow and Washington have different views as to how to use nuclear weapons: by using a concept of '**launch-on-warning**' or '**launch under attack**'.⁷

On the eve of the NPT Review Conference that was held last April and May at the UN headquarters, the **New York Times published an op-ed, titled "How to Avert a Nuclear War"** with the intention of both setting the tone for the discussions as well as "batting around" a number of ideas and proposals designed to help the US acquire a unilateral advantage in the nuclear matchup. Co-authors of the op-ed in the NYT are retired generals: **James E. Cartwright and Vladimir Dvorkin**.⁸ *A note:* James E. Cartwright, a former US Marine Corps general, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commander of the United States Strategic Command, is the chairman of the Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, of which Vladimir Dvorkin, a retired Russian major general who headed the research institute of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, is a member.

The article contained a number of proposals from them with the aim to encourage both Washington and Moscow to eliminate one component of their nuclear strategies – namely, "launch-on-warning (LOW)." In the United States this is understood to mean a retaliatory strike against an enemy who has acted first and already launched nuclear missiles against the US, after obtaining verification of such an attack from American ground radar stations

⁷ Козин В. Статья «Запуск по предупреждению. Отказ от этой стратегии увеличит возможности американского ядерного оружия»//Красная звезда. 2015. 23 апреля.

⁸ Cartwright J. and Dvorkin V. How to Avert a Nuclear War//The New York Times. 2015. April 19. See: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/opinion/how-to-avert-a-nuclear-war.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=1>.

and space-based early-warning systems, but before any “enemy” ICBMs and SLBMs have managed to explode inside the United States.

First of all, this pitch is not new. There was a time when a group of Western experts suggested discarding this strategy and taking a look at another, ‘launch-under-attack (LUA)’, which allows for a nuclear strike in reprisal against a probable enemy, but only after at least one nuclear warhead has actually exploded in the US.

Based on the proposal put forward by the two former generals, it seems that although the US is retaining the use of nuclear weapons in initial “preemptive” and “preventive” strikes as a primary postulate of its own nuclear doctrine, the United States would like to see Russia officially renounce the idea of any potential retaliatory attack on the USA. Russia’s new Military Doctrine updated in December 2014 said that it can use nuclear weapons if it is attacked by weapons of mass destruction or by conventional forces that would lead to the very existence of the state. This means – only in response.

The two authors also make reference to the fact that Russia’s missiles early warning system is “compromised” and supposedly could sent a false signal about a nuclear attack, due to computer glitches or errors committed by the duty officers at the nuclear launch control centers. Both of these former high-ranking soldiers suggest that Russian and US leaders get together as soon as possible to discuss doing away with the LOW strategy. Otherwise, they say, something could happen that could not be undone, such as if the two early warning systems were to transmit fallacious information to the national nuclear launch control centers, seeming to show ICBMs and SLBMs headed in each other’s direction.

But as far as Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are concerned – they are very unlikely to make such a “mistake.” As he stated in a recent interview with the journal “Natsionalnaya Oborona” (or “National Defence”), **Major General Andrei Burbin**, the chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Central Command, claims that those troops place a high priority on ensuring that their activities are thoroughly safeguarded against any sort of force majeure or other unforeseen events. He declares that matter has now been “100%” resolved in our country.⁹ But this is a problem that the Americans really need to work on – because this is still an issue for them, even after a special Pentagon commission identified manifold deficiencies in the proficiency tests taken by officers on alert duty at the launch control centers for America’s strategic nuclear weapons.

This is why the proposal to scrap the LOW strategy is unlikely to be accepted by the Russians. **It will be too late to react when US strategic or tactical nuclear missiles land in Russia.**

⁹ *Андрей Бурбин: «РВСН способны выполнить боевую задачу в любых условиях»// Национальная оборона.2015. Март. № 3. С. 22.*

But is there any other way to avoid the accidental or unintentional use of nuclear weapons in the world? Of course there is. The bottom line is not in the debates, whether to agree to LOW or LUA.

Why don't the two largest nuclear powers on the globe embrace a more radical proposal – one that Moscow has repeatedly suggested to Washington, starting back in the Soviet days and continuing in the form of overtures from the Russian leaders – which is the idea **to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons in a first strike or even to refuse to use them at all against each other?** This is the quickest way to get rid of nuclear 'Damoclis gladius'.

For the first time an initiative on no-first use of nuclear weapons was put forward in 1982.

Unfortunately, the many years that have passed without action on this initiative have shown that America's military and political leaders still resolutely refuse to implement this simple, straightforward idea to which many nations of the world subscribe to.

Missile Defense (MD/BMD)

Slide 28. The US missile defense (MD) or BCMD (ballistic and cruise missiles defenses) deployment issue still is and will be the most thorny and acute stumbling block in Russian and US relationships in many years to come.¹⁰ In this context the BCMD acronym is more adequate, because contemporary MD system is actually used to intercept both ballistic and cruise missiles.

Washington's miscalculation **in this issue is that without any restraint it has engaged into building a "missile defense roof" too far away from its shores.** This infrastructure is being enhanced by tactical and conventional weapon under the Chicago summit decisions of 2012: these three elements are operating as a single mechanism.

It has been confirmed in a number of political speeches and remarks by the US VIPs: by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow in Israel, by US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in Poland in January 2014, and recently by other US State Department officials (e.g. Frank Rose). The views expressed by them make anyone undoubtedly believe that the EPAA will be

¹⁰ See the details: *Козин В.* Эволюция противоракетной обороны США и позиция России (1945-2013)//Москва: РИСИ. 2013. 384 С. (монография; с иллюстрациями); *Kozin V.* Evolution of the US Ballistic Missile Defense System and Russia's Stance//Moscow: InfoRos. 2013.142 PP.; *Kozin V.* Missile Defense Hits a Brick Wall//The Moscow Times.2013.1 March; *Kozin V.* Missile Defense Arms Race//The Moscow Times. 2013. 25 November (критический ответ заместителю генерального секретаря НАТО Александра Вершбоу по проблематике ПРО США); *Козин В.* Карт-бланш. Пентагон везет в Европу ядерное оружие. Переговоры России и США об ограничении военной деятельности возможны только при равных стартовых географических позициях//Независимая газета. 2015.14 апреля <http://www.ng.ru/armies/2015-04-14/3_kartblansh.html>; *Козин В.* ПРО с претензией на глобальность. Основные итоги и перспективы развертывания системы//Независимое военное обозрение. 2015. 3 июля <http://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2015-07-03/1_pro.html>.

implemented in full – that is by 2022 – phase 4 including. More than that: the EPAA will be extended till 2030 and beyond, thus making the Europeans as the hostages of its miscalculated game.

No doubt, Russia will respond to all these current preparations by the USA. After the ground-breaking ceremony took place in Deveselu last October the Russian Federation has deployed its “Iskander-M” operational missile in the Southern part of Russia. However, the Kremlin has not yet deployed these missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave so far.¹¹ But it will definitely do so, if the US missile defense Redzikowo project in Poland will be launched.

Mikhail Ulyanov, Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Department, Russian MFA, told the “Interfax” News Agency February 1, 2014 that Moscow **may even make a decision to withdraw from the New START** if the USA keep going with the deployment of its missile defense system. Thus, Russia has repeated this warning several times after **President Barack Obama’s** directive to trigger off the European Phased Adaptive Approach concept in 2009.

The best solution of the missile defense dilemma between the USA and Russia is to cancel the EPAA, as the major irritant in Russo-American relationships, including preplanned construction of missile defense operational complexes at Deveselu and Redzikowo.

Europe needs a new treaty on conventional arms control: a CFE-2 Treaty

Slide 29. Europe needs a new treaty on conventional arms control or **Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 2 (CFE-2)**. The reason: the unbalanced CFE-1 and CFE-1A are actually dead and will not be resurrected.

The **Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty** was signed on Nov. 19, 1990 in Paris and went into effect in 1992. Initially, it was signed by representatives from 16 NATO states, as well as by six members of the Warsaw Pact. The agreement placed a limit on the size of conventional armed forces and established a maximum for the number of conventional weapons that the parties to the treaty may deploy in Europe.

After the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO’s expansion at the expense of the Soviet Union’s former allies has created an imbalance in the categories of weapons listed above. In light of the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the expansion of NATO, an **Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty** Treaty was drawn up in 1999, which would replace the treaty’s established limits for each bloc with a system based on national and territorial ceilings on arms and equipment for each signatory state. However, this never actually happened.

¹¹ *Richardson D.* No Iskanders deployed in Kaliningrad, says Putin//Jane’s International Defence Review. 2014. February.P. 14.

There are a **number of reasons for Russia to look negatively on the CFE Treaty, which include:**

- It has been ratified by only Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, but not a single one of the treaty's NATO signatories.
- It contains various types of artificial restrictions with regard to Russia, such as the limitations set by the Flank Agreement.
- The three Baltic states refused to become parties to the treaty when they joined NATO.

The flank limitations stipulated by them have made a heavy blow upon Russian defense interests. The blow was so strong that in his recently released memoirs "Duty" **ex-Defense Secretary Robert Gates** has expressed surprise that Russia had agreed to hamper its own troops' movements on its own territory. He recalls that he told President Putin that he would not tolerate, if for example the CFE treaty limited his right to move the US forces from Texas to California.¹²

In addition, throughout the duration of the treaty, its Western signatories have been stubbornly opposed to issuing a definition of the term "**substantial combat forces**" in relation to this covenant, intending to someday move to augment their conventional weapons and armed forces in the zone covered by the treaty. Another disadvantage of this covenant was also that it did not apply to naval forces or their activities, at least in the seas bordering the European continent.

It is therefore entirely logical that Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, announced the full termination of the **Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty** in November 2014, adding that **Moscow does not intend to return to it.**

That is why **a new Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty or CFE-2 has to be elaborated.** It should correspond to the present-day realities and reflect the balance of interests of all its potential participants. CFE-2 should be free from flank limitations, free from fixing substantial balances in favor of any group of nations. It has to contain a clear-cut definition of "substantial combat forces" and engulf more than originally **five types of the treaty limited equipment or TLE.** It has to include all three Baltic nations – Latvia, Lithuania and, and it has to be ratified by all states that will sign it.

In mid-August Moscow has officially informed the UN Secretary General that it is ready to tackle a new regime of conventional arms control that would take into account the current realities in Europe.

The new treaty must also stipulate the complete withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons and all related infrastructure from Europe and the Asian part of Turkey, as well as the removal of both the US ground-based

¹² Gates R. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. Washington: Alfred A. Knopf. 2014.

missile-defense system from the European continent, plus the naval component of her missile shield from the adjoining seas.

NATO should discontinue its 24h/7days a week **"Baltic Air Policing" operation** in the airspace of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which has been flown for eleven years and is clearly intended to provoke Russia. It has already become fully uninterrupted, and is conducted too close to Russian territory. Three *de jure* nuclear-weapon states are involved in it. Some nuclear-capable aircraft are being involved in this operation. Therefore, it has to be cancelled.

At the same time the new covenant must not be tied to any type of local conflict. And it must **prohibit all signatory states from employing their national armed forces against their own citizens**. It mainly refers to Ukraine.

The other kind of conventional weapon – **conventional armed drones (UAVs)**, are frequently used against civilians. An international treaty banning their use has to be adopted. Naturally, it will not block the use of non-lethal UAVs – navigational, reconnaissance, traffic, etc.

FINAL THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS

So, within five years the East and the West have travelled from the "strategic partnership" principle announced at the NATO-Russia Council in Lisbon in November 2010 to a new phase of the Cold War. Very quickly. That is very sad.

Slide 30. Recently, Russia has indentified **17 external threats** to its national security in its updated Military Doctrine enacted December 26th last year) 13 such threats have been named in the previous Military Doctrine of 2010. All these threats have multiplied by the current Colder War that is unfolding. For the sake of comparison: the US National Security Strategy updated in February 2015 identifies **8 external threats**.

The current Colder War is not based upon ideology, but rather upon geopolitical ambitions fostered by a limited group of countries.

Before I will wrap up and take as many your questions as you may wish, I want to leave you with some final thoughts. With all the challenges in the world, it is sometimes easy to despair, but I believe that through hard work, patience and persistence, we can meet and solve these challenges.

There are several immediate steps that might be taken

A potential confrontation between Washington and Moscow could be stronger and deeper than during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 and after NATO "dual-track decision" stamped in December 1979. The difference between looming military crisis and these two is that during a new

one the U.S. will have more interceptors than during 1962 and 1979 stand-off.

Slide 31. Russia's updated foreign policy, issued in mid-February, says our country has consistently supported constructive cooperation with the USA in the area of arms control, including taking into consideration the unbreakable link between strategic offensive and defensive capabilities and the urgency of making the nuclear disarmament process multilateral. It also assumes that negotiations on a further reduction of offensive nuclear weapons are possible "only taking into consideration all the factors affecting global strategic stability, without any exceptions."

Instead of thinking how to encircle Russia with nuclear and missile defense weapons, the American side should think about how it can work together with us and other interested parties to prevent meteorites from raining down on our planet. Obviously, Russia and the U.S. would maintain their right to deploy and upgrade their infrastructure for the interception of ballistic missiles **on their territories**. A potential outcome from the impasse: Instead of ushering in a qualitatively new arms race, the nuclear powers have to hammer out a new multilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The USA and its NATO allies should stop any military build-up near Russia's borders. The US tactical nuclear weapons with relevant infrastructure and the missile defense assets must be removed from Europe and brought to the continental USA.

No one in Russia and the USA contemplates a nuclear confrontation, but if comparatively minor differences are allowed to escalate through inattention, no one can predict what might happen in the immediate future. And **de facto nuclear-weapon states (Israel, India, Pakistan and the North Korea) and de jure nuclear-weapon states (five great nuclear powers)** have to assume commitments not to use nuclear weapons in the first strike. The **next New US-Russian START** (or START-4 in Russian) might be debated provided all previous arrangements are implemented. The USA and NATO have to regard Russia as their permanent ally, rather than permanent foe. Russia will have to do the same.

An international treaty **banning arms deployment in outer space** should be accepted by all states.

A qualitatively **new Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty** has to be elaborated and signed between all NATO member-states, including new entrants, and Russia. It has to be balanced and provide an equal security for all its potential participants. The new treaty must stop the movement of "forward deployment forces".

The present-day Ukrainian crisis must not overshadow or torpedo the paramount mission to enhance and fortify radically the European security edifice. It is the urgent task for all European nations – big or small, nuclear

or non-nuclear, aligned or non-aligned. **Ukraine will have to declare its pledge to retain its non-nuclear and non-aligned status for ever.**

CONCLUSION

Slide 32. There is the urgent need to carry out a **rational reconstruction of the present-day military-political situation in Europe** and adapt it to the new realities in the system of international relations. In general terms, the time has come to prohibit from the international life the use of threats under dubious pretexts and vague explanations. The world community at large must firmly oppose the attempts to revive the results of the WW2 and consistently combat any forms and manifestations of racism, xenophobia, aggressive nationalism and chauvinism.

As once upon a time **Abraham Lincoln used to observe that he always won victories over his enemies by making them his friends.** So, US/NATO tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense in Europe will never make Russia as a bona fide friend for the US and NATO, if the US/NATO tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense are still fielded on the European continent and around it to the detriment of our relations that are hardly to be characterized in this particular case as the relations of "strategic partnership". So, why to overcharge them more and more?

Slide 33. Russia does not want and will not want to have any type of the Cold War with any country. Russia has experienced too many invasions and wars. It cannot afford any new war. It is the only universal peace that the human race is needed. Any Colder War must not be transformed into a "hot war".

Instead of imposing the Colder War that has already been initiated and producing qualitatively new threats and challenges the entire Europe and the world at large really will have to embark upon a really global **Détente 2.0.**

Slide 34. A special US-Russia's summit should be arranged without any delay to tackle all outstanding issues that are existing.. It is impossible to convene such a meeting during the current US presidency. This is regrettable, but it is a fact: It is unrealistic at the moment to expect a speedy improvement of U.S.-Russia relations. The relations between the two countries today may be even worse than during Soviet times — that is a really disturbing development.

An All-European Security Summit should be convened to tackle the security-related issues that have direct bearing on Europe. We all remember of the Helsinki Final Act. It was very useful endeavor. The Finnish capital was a very nice place to reach that Declaration 20 years ago.

Why not to convene an All-European Security Summit in Switzerland? – a widely renown neutral state, a venue where many international agreements have been successfully reached in the past.

Some extra issues (if they are raised during Q & A session)

There are several other issues that are influencing upon the general military-political climate in Europe and on the arms control process.

At least here are only 4 of them.

1.Intensification of hostile accusations and war-flagging rhetoric

Hostile statements are increasing. Russians especially reacted with indignation when they have heard that Russia ranks second place between Ebola disease and "Islamic State", as **Barack Obama** put it at the recent UN General Assembly session in September 2014 and in two more occasions. It was not a joke.

And again after that in the updated "National Security Strategy of the USA" signed by President Obama last February Russia has been named six times in the context of committing "aggression" in Ukraine.

As to Crimea – that was a peaceful reunification of the peninsula with Russia, in keeping with any nation's right to self-determination, and it was conducted on the basis of a peaceful and democratic referendum. As for Crimea, Russian troops were stationed there a long time ago before the Crimean Republic decided to reunite with Russia - they have stayed there under several bilateral accords signed with Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet division; they have never exceeded the overall limit of 25,000 men. During the reunification the balance between Russian and Ukrainian troops in Crimea was 16,000 to 18,000 men respectively. There have not been any clashes between them. No single shot was fired.

For Russians Crimea is a sacred land. Russian Grand Prince Vladimir was baptized there in the year of 988 AD. The same year and he went on to baptize the rest population of Rus in Kiev.

Russians got Crimea in the course of 30 naval battles and land wars against the Ottoman Empire they fought for three centuries.

Crimea became an integral part of the Russian Empire in 1783.

Crimea was not ceded to Ukraine in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev. To view the issue from an international legal perspective: the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation did not have the authority to decide this question. In addition, the Presidium had no quorum. Sevastopol was never ceded to Ukraine at all as the city under direct federal jurisdiction.

And at the meeting in Belavezha Forest in 1991, that time Ukraine's president Leonid Kravchuk promised Russia's Boris Yeltsin that Crimea would be returned to Russia.

In 1992 the Russian Parliament declared Khrushchev's 1954 act as null and void.

Crimea will be the Russian land forever. It will never be returned to anybody as a gift or as incentive to expand "friendly ties".

There have not been any Russian 'aggression' in Crimea. It does not fall into the definition of the term 'aggression', as interpreted by the UN General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1974. 'Aggression' cannot occur when not a single shot is fired and there are no dead or wounded – and this is precisely how that reunification was carried out, during which Crimea once again sailed into her "home harbor." An 'aggressor' does not usually return captured weapons and military equipment to the alleged "victim" of his 'aggression'. But Russia has returned to Kiev Ukrainian weapons deployed in Crimea.

Of the two million inhabitants of the Republic of Crimea, only a few thousand abandoned that land. The others, as we know, welcomed the long-awaited reunification with their homeland. The recent trips by Japanese and French delegations to Crimea said that people of Crimea are happy for that reunification. During the referendum, more than 97% of voters cast their ballots in favor of rejoining Russia. After one year since its reunification, as public opinion polls show, **around 96% of the Crimeans are still happy with their fate.** Nearly all Ukrainian servicemen in Crimea took oath to serve in the Russian Armed Forces. Its reunification with Russia took place peacefully, as the result of democratic referendum held last March.

As to Donbass, none of the representatives of the OSCE, nor any other human-rights organizations have found any 'Russian aggressors' there. Last February the Ukrainian Head

of the General Chief of Staff has admitted publicly that there were no Russian troops in Donbass.

About one million Ukrainian citizens have already decamped for Russia in order to escape the rampant genocide unleashed by the current leaders of Ukraine. Never before in the history of the world have any people seeking refuge from an 'aggressor' escaped by fleeing to that 'aggressor's' country. 'Aggressors' never send humanitarian aid to 'the occupied territory'. Russia did it 34 times already by sending 100 trucks-convoys in each case.

Kiev has cut gas supplies to Donetsk. Russia has started to supply it. Kiev stopped paying wages, salaries and pensions to the Donbass people, Russia assumed such a responsibility upon itself. From 1991 to 2014 Russia transferred to Ukraine investments up to nearly \$ 200 billion.

Some people do not understand or do not want to understand an indisputable fact: the people of the Donbass do not want to live as part of Ukraine under the same condition – Kiev has shed too much blood and destroyed too many civilian lives.

That cannot be forgotten. Ever. About 7,000 civilians in the Donbass have been killed and near 15,000 wounded, 65% of the homes in the region have been destroyed by Ukrainian regular troops using heavy weapons, white phosphorus, cluster bombs, and Tochka-U ballistic missile systems with 500 kg warheads.

That is why Donbass does not want to leave under the ultranationalist regime in Ukraine that came to power as a result of an illegal, unconstitutional, and bloody coup.

For Washington it was the easiest thing to do: to recognize the Crimean reunification with Russia. But among the two states - Ukraine and Russia – Washington unfortunately has chosen a failed, unpredictable, dangerous ultra-nationalistic state, a state whose statements are not fulfilled, a state that does not pay back credits and loans. So, currently Ukraine is a rather risky and dangerous client in the world economy. **As Robert Fico, Prime Minister of Slovakia**, said in October 2014: "I have a feeling that Ukraine is waiting for resolving its own difficulties by all others, but not by itself".

The dramatic developments in Ukraine have revealed a large-scale crisis in terms of international law, the basic norms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. **We see numerous violations of Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 and 11 of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of Article 3 of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948.**

Unbiased experts are witnessing the application of double standards in the assessment of crimes against the civilian population of southeastern Ukraine, violations of the fundamental human rights to life and personal integrity. People are subjected to torture, to cruel and humiliating punishment, discrimination and illegal rulings.

Ukraine and the USA have violated the Budapest Memorandum Of 1994, namely article 1 and 2, because it violated its own territorial integrity and still uses coercion versus its own citizens in Donbass. Donbass is under total Kiev's blockade. Due to the Ukrainian army drive to southeastern regions of the country the area still witnessing a severe humanitarian catastrophe, as many citizens have struggled without clean water, electricity and other basic necessities.

Currently, Ukraine has \$ 80 billion-worth of external debt. The standard of living reduced by five times. Kiev cannot pay for gas because it spends too much for war against its own people. As the Ukrainian ex-Primier Julia Timoshenko put it, the post-Maidan corruption has exceeded the level of the pre-Maidan corruption. 40,000 medium sized enterprises in the region have stopped functioning. The level of unemployment in Ukraine has reached 40% of its workforce. As the result of the war in Donbass Kiev unleashed by itself Ukraine lost 65% of its armed forces, 25% of its industry and almost all hard currency reserves.

It looks like that some Western countries has in mind a number of long-term strategic aims via Ukraine. Any supplies of arms to Kiev will run counter to the Minsk-2 accord dated 12th February. Such deliveries will create an illusion of the crisis management in Ukraine by military means. Recently Ukrainian President admitted publicly that Kiev have signed agreements on arms deliveries to Ukraine, including lethal, with 11 EU nations.

There is yet another factor related to Ukraine: massive spread of fascist and die-hard ultra-national ideology hostile to non-Ukrainians and other nations. **Glorification of the German Nazi and recognition of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as war**

veterans which has been accused of war crimes including massive killings of Jews and Poles in Ukraine, are alarming bells for Europe that had suffered immensely during the WW2 from Nazi. It looks like the remedy to combat and eradicate a "fascist virus" – the remedy produced by the Nuremberg Tribunal held in 1945-1946 – in the present-day environment has become non-effective.

As Steven Cohen has observed last year: «The current crisis is the most worse and potentially the most dangerous confrontation between the USA and Russia since the end of the Carribean crisis. This is a new «Cold War», and its epicenter is currently not in Berlin, but rather near the Russian borders».

The EU persuades Kiev to offer Donbass a special status on a permanent basis, but not for three years.

2.Economic and financial sanctions vs Russia

Economic and financial sanctions versus Russia and a number of high-ranking Russian officials outnumber similar restrictive measures imposed upon the Soviet Union in the past, e.g. due to its military involvement in Afghanistan, or against Russia when Georgia attacked South Ossetia in 2008.

Russia does not understand why these sanctions have been imposed against it. Moscow has done nothing wrong to be punished. But at the same time there is a strong feeling amongst Russians that West's colonial-style sanctions on Russia have little to do more to resolve the Ukrainian crisis. The true goals of these restrictions are to alter and to reshape Russia, to change its positions on key international issues that are the most fundamental for it, and make it to accept the unacceptable visions of the West. These sanctions are unlikely to divert Russia from its current stance.

94% of Russians have said that they are not afraid of any US and the EU sanctions and would tolerate them even if they might have any negative effect. For Russians these sanctions are "not so hot, and not so cold", as they used to say. Sanctions are already undermining the foundations of world trade, the WTO rules and the principle of inviolability of private property.

But the more anti-Russian sanctions are used, the stronger will be moral support of Ukraine from the West in Kiev's "blundering into a disaster", as **Robert McNamara**, the ex-US Defense Secretary, once entitled his famous memoirs.

Moscow regard the mechanism of these sanctions looks very strange. Soon after the Minsk-2 accord on a ceasefire has been signed these sanctions have been toughened instead of limiting them. The rebels in Donbass have pulled back their heavy weapons from the buffer zone while Ukrainian Army has not – nevertheless sanctions have toughened again against Russia rather than versus Ukraine. That is illogic.

Sanctions are already undermining the foundations of world trade, the WTO rules and the principle of inviolability of private property.

Sanctions will not produce a deep-seated effect on Russia's economy as their creators have thought. Last year national budget will have positive surplus of more than 1 trillion Roubles or around Euros 200 billion. Russia still has US \$ 400 billion in gold and hard currency reserves.

On the other hand Western sanctions are as sharp double-edged tools: so far European countries have lost US several hundred billions US dollars after they imposed sanctions against Russia.

Besides obvious economic consequences, the EU sanctions versus Russia have political implications that are harmful to the Europeans themselves. It is known that sanctions have inflicted to Russia's economy a certain damage. But at the same time the European economy also has suffered harmful consequences. **Due to sanctions the trade turnover between the EU and Russia has dropped by 38%.**

Western sanctions are flying as a boomerang. For example, Poland introduced sanctions against Russia and immediately lost huge Russian apples market: every year Poland sold 900,000 tons of apples to Russia or 90% of all its export volume in apples. Currently Russia buys apples from Serbia, New Zealand and South Africa, but not from Poland. Polish apple industry has been ruined by the Poles themselves. Nobody wants to buy Polish apples even for 10 Eurocents per kilogram. German apple produces lament that they can sell their apples only by 12 Euro cent per kilogram, while they are to be sold not less than 30 Euro cents to maintain normal business. French and Belgian farmers are

pouring out fresh milk onto the streets, Spanish orange growers destroy their orange crops, Greeks do not know what to do with their kiwis.

Some Western sanctions look irrelevant, like a sanction against Nikolai, a 10-year son of the Byelorussian President **Aleksander Lukashenko** or against Russian MP **Elena Mizulina** who is in favor of retaining a traditional family. Some sanctions are simply laughable, like a sanction versus a horse from a stable belonging to the Chechen President **Ramzan Kadyrov**.¹³

The USA and European nations who have used the mechanism of sanctions will find it difficult to recover from reputational damage inflicted by their own sanctions. Christine Lagarde, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund said October 9, 2014: "While the impact of the conflict in Ukraine has been relatively contained to date, further escalation could generate significant negative spillovers, both regionally and globally."

A new package of the US sanctions versus Russia is a primitive attempt to revenge at a time when the situation in Ukraine is not developing along the scenario written hastily in Washington. Whatever their scope, it is useless to talk to Russia in the language of sanctions. In the atmosphere of massive anti-Russian sanctions stemming from the West, Moscow has the right to impose its own sanctions against the USA in every domain in response. But, as you see Moscow has not embarked upon the entire list of sanctions against those nations who have decided to use them first and for nothing special.

It would be fair if such sanctions would have been imposed versus current Ukrainian regime for its atrocities against its own citizens, for the fact that Ukraine has never been and will never be as a fair economic and financial counterpart. If Russia, the EU and the USA have imposed sanctions against Ukraine, Kiev would have immediately stopped its massive war crimes in the South-East against its own citizens.

It looks like that the USA has had in mind a number of long-term strategic aims while interfering into Ukrainian affairs.

In terms of Russia the USA wanted to weaken its military, political, economic and financial potential. The maximum goal is to disintegrate Russia, and to implant a frozen conflict to its territory. The most dangerous task is to confront Slavic civilization in a mutually destructive conflagration. It will never happen.

In terms of Russia there is another strategic goal of a personal nature – to undermine the prestige of President Putin (minimum) or to topple him (maximum), by replacing him by another pro-Western leader submissive to the West. This task will not be implemented.

In terms of NATO the goal is to increase its expenditures and to create Very High Readiness Forces. It will be brought about.

In terms of Europe – the idea is to weaken its competitiveness in relation of the US trade and economy, but not to strangle it entirely, and to diminish the value of Euro. Partially, the mission is not to let Russia and Germany to hammer out the union of the German technologies and capital with huge Russian market and workforce.

3. The price of the Cold War 2.0?

Unfortunately, the world is becoming less safe and more unpredictable.

The risks are increasing everywhere.

The security system has become seriously weakened, fragmented and deformed.

A unilateral diktat and imposing one's own models produces the opposite result.

Instead of settling conflicts it leads to their escalation, to the growing spread of chaos, to a very dubious support for open neo-fascists to Islamic radicals.

The world is witnessing new efforts to explode the entire global situation, to draw new dividing lines and put together coalitions directed against others having different views, to create the image of an enemy as was the case during the Cold War years, and to impose a

¹³ In late August and early October 2014, horse called Zazu won 5,000 Euros and 2,000 Euros during horse racing in Baden-Baden and Dusseldorf. The German Government, however, banned the horses' owner from receiving prize money, saying Kadyrov was subject to EU sanctions. The authorities also banned the horses from further participation in races till sanctions on Kadyrov are lifted. See: <<http://rt.com/politics/197396-kadyrov-horses-sanctions-apology>>.

convenient model for perpetuating unlucky leadership based upon 'indispensability'. There are too many voices of the possibility of eruption of the Third World War.

The Report prepared by the **Polish Institute of International relations** in October 2014 made it clear that the reasons for the Russia–West crisis run much deeper than a deficit of trust or inadequate channels of communication between the parties. The mistrust itself is not a product of misunderstanding of the motives of the other side, but rather it reflects fundamental differences in the sphere of values and conceptualization of interests between the West and Russia.¹⁴ But, unfortunately, the Report puts a blame for this exclusively upon Russia.

Last April the Russian "Public Opinion Foundation" reported that 54% of Russians were confident that is a real threat to unleash a large-scale war between Russia and NATO member-states. As a new poll has revealed, Russians are increasingly worried about a military threat from outside. At the end of last February, as the independent Levada Center pollster said **68% of Russians believe a foreign power threatens Russia's national security, a 24 percentage points increase over the last decade.**

The other Russian national public opinion poll center claimed that **68% Russians believe that such threat might come from other non-NATO nations.** Such alarming feelings have not existed during the first phase of the Cold War.

A new stage of the Cold War will undoubtedly lead to an enemy-image period of the past we managed to overcome in the 90s. **Again public opinion polls show that currently 81% of Russians feel negatively about the United States and 71% about the European Union. Today 42% of Russians dubbed the relations between Russia and the USA as that of "enemies". In January 2014 before the Ukrainian crisis the same answer was only 4%.** So, who is the winner? Is it a normal situation? No. My generation failed to find the way out from this impasse. Who will succeed?

When Barack Obama came to the White House in 2008 and announced his now-defunct reset policy, a total of 21 bilateral government groups were formed to deal with almost all imaginary issues ranging from science, medicine and human rights to space, climate control and security. Some groups were to deal with the issues like arms control, international security, cyber security, defense and military technical cooperation and several other related subjects. Later, however, President Obama with the support from Congress, following some logic that is hard to comprehend, ordered the work of all these groups to be frozen as a symbolic gesture to punish Russia for invading the Crimea.

Currently, there is very little chance of rebuilding trust between the West and Russia **without tackling the fundamental differences between them.** As **Jeffrey Tayler**, an editor of "The Atlantic", recently observed: "America embarks on this road to confrontation [with Russia] without sure, seasoned hands at the wheel in the White House; in modern history, no US administration has proved more inept at dealing with Russia... Americans are being marched off to a new war—a Cold one for now—with no idea of what the outcome will be. They need to demand of the Obama Administration: "Tell us, how this ends." Really: how this will end?"¹⁵

4. Why is Russia going to skip the Nuclear Security Summit in the US?

Moscow has officially informed those countries that took part in the previous nuclear-security summits, held in Washington in 2010, Seoul in 2012, and the Hague in 2014, that it will not be able to participate in the preparations for the fourth summit, which is scheduled for 2016 in the US.

In the past, Russia has always been an advocate, as it continues to be today, for tightening nuclear security. Since the first summit on this issue four years ago, it participated in preparation for subsequent high-level meetings of this type..

¹⁴ Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Central European Views on Rebuilding Trust in the Euro-Atlantic Region Warsaw: PISM. 2014. October. P.5. The Report can be found: <http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=18495>.

¹⁵ Jeffrey Tayler. The Seething Anger of Putin's Russia//The Atlantic. 2014.September 22. <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/russia-west-united-states-past-future-conflict/380533/2/>>.

The motives behind Moscow's refusal have an entirely different origin: it has nothing to do with the Ukrainian crisis or even some other circumstances unrelated to this forum, but rather stems from the following:

First is the fact that as of now, most of the **political commitments made by the participants at the previous summits have been met**, and great progress has already been made toward strengthening nuclear security. Thus, from a practical point of view, the goals set by the summits' political agenda have been accomplished.

Second is the fact that the one-sided approach to preparing for a new, high-level event, as proposed by Washington, **allows special rules for the United States, South Korea, and the Netherlands**, because they were the organizers behind the previous summits on nuclear security. The US has arbitrarily taken the position that this trio should be the ones to develop the final documents for the scheduled meeting, despite the discrimination against the other participants, most of which will be excluded from taking part in this process. This situation has caused the Russian Foreign Ministry serious concern. There is not, and cannot be, any just international precedent for having "primary" and "secondary" players that are responsible for the preparation of important multilateral documents.

Third, it is of no small concern to Russia that Washington plans for the **established limited-membership working groups to prepare the guiding documents for such international organizations** and initiatives as the UN, the IAEA, Interpol, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership. The Russians feel that it is unacceptable and counterproductive to establish such a precedent of outside interference in the planning of the work of international organizations, which have more significant expertise and are founded on generally accepted democratic procedures.

It is worth noting that the United States itself has still not ratified the relevant international treaties on this issue – neither the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and its 2005 amendments nor the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Nevertheless, Washington is trying to assume the role of the primary and privileged "player" in this area, although it has a feeble claim to any kind of "special" role, since this problem is multilateral and international. Also, to have certain rights, one must meet certain obligations, including compliance with the international agreements listed above.

Given these factors, Russia cannot foresee any real prospect of taking part in the work to prepare for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Nevertheless, Moscow expects Washington to inform Russia about the preparatory process.

As an alternative response, Moscow is ready to focus on strengthening cooperation within the IAEA, in particular, concerning the preparations for the next high-level conference on this issue to be held under that agency's auspices, which is also scheduled for 2016.